Yes, yes, yet another blog post about #wikileaks #cablegate

True, the release of 251,000 documents to the public, but mainly to the media, is the biggest news of the day, but as it pertains to relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Turkey, there’s not much that we didn’t know already. Well, perhaps save for the somewhat embarrassing revelation in a closed and classified letter from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte that the U.S. considered imposing sanctions on Armenia after discovering that the supply of weapons to Iran ended up in the hands of insurgents in Iraq.

Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza, and Ambassador Yovanovitch have raised with you our deep concerns about Armenia’s transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries, neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this case. By law, the transfer of these weapons requires us to consider whether there is a basis for the imposition of U.S. sanctions. If sanctions are imposed, penalties could include the cutoff of U.S. assistance and certain export restrictions.

Not that many here will likely care given widespread opposition to U.S. policy in the region from a very definitely Russophile public. And, of course, the fact that the U.S. didn’t apply sanctions while Iran remains one of only two import and export routes available to a landlocked and otherwise blockaded country. Of course, it gives ample ammunition to those opposed to the president, Serge Sargsyan, but it remains to be seen whether this will amount to anything more than a whimper. Just don’t mention the brother of one opposition leader implicated in the supply of dual use equipment which could be used for biochemical purposes to Iran in 2002…

Meanwhile, what is interesting about the latest collection of confidential and sensitive communications released, however, is that they do at least backup certain speculation regarding what we thought we already knew, but couldn’t really say we knew for sure. For example, despite attempts by the opposition in Armenia to accuse the incumbent president of ready to sell out national interests in dealings with Azerbaijan and Turkey, this doesn’t actually appear to be the case. Indeed, Azerbaijan comes across as the bad guy here with its successful attempt to obstruct and even derail the now frozen Armenia-Turkey protocols to normalize relations.

He told U/S Burns that the “Sword of Damocles” of the April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging over the NK Process, as well as the Turkey-Armenia normalization process. He suggested that it would be easier if the Turkey-Armenia normalization could be considered after April in order to allow more time for progress on NK. He also took the opportunity to press the USG to apply maximum pressure on Yerevan to make concessions on NK. […]

Of course, I have to admit to agreeing on the U.S. position as to how the two are indirectly linked, but I’m in a minority on this one.

U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. believes that progress on the Turkey-Armenia protocols could create political space for Sargsian to be more flexible on NK. He continued that the reverse was also true, that a failure of the Turkey-Armenia process would almost certainly result in serious negative consequences for the NK process.

The same is true when it comes to efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh. While the opposition in Armenia has again been attempting to win the hearts of the masses by alleging Sargsyan was ready to sacrifice Nagorno Karabakh, one document suggests quite the contrary. Instead, it even quotes the Azerbaijani president as alleging that it is Armenia holding up progress by insisting on a definite date for a referendum to be held to determine Karabakh’s final status.

Aliyev noted that at Sochi, President Sargsian had inserted a proposal for specifying a definite date for a referendum or plebiscite on NK final status. This, Aliyev argued, undermined the entire framework of the agreement, which is premised on an eventual referendum ) with no definite timeframe ) in exchange for legalizing “the illegally established regime in NK.”" […]

For sure, such a clear indication of how Aliyev considers the state of the negotiation process is incredibly valuable indeed although it also shows how far off from resolution the two sides actually are short of massive international intervention. True, Aliyev considers that Russia president Medvedev’s interest in resolving the conflict is genuine, even if implying that Putin is preventing that from happening, but it is also very telling that Azerbaijan seems keen on convincing the U.S. to apply pressure on Armenia to resolve the conflict as well. Reference to deepening Armenia’s isolation in the region is also very poignant, but most Armenians seem uninterested in looking past their borders anyway.

The February document, however, does provide a brief glimpse into the recent release of Azerbaijani video blogging youth activists Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli with Aliyev reportedly agreeing to release them after an appeals process. “I think this can be done. I had no intention to hurt anyone,” Aliyev apparently responded to U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns when the suggestion was made. It’s just a pity that one cable really had to go and put U.S.-Azerbaijan relations in jeopardy by refering to the Azerbaijani president’s wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, as having had “so much plastic surgery that […] she can barely still move her face.”

Update 1: Russia threatens Azerbaijan

Since writing this post, more cables are being publicized, including one from the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek which alleges that Prince Andrew, a frequent if controversial visitor to Azerbaijan, recounted an exchange with Aliyev which really sheds some light on how Russia perceives its role in the region as well as in resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

[…] He stated the following story related to him recently by Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev. Aliyev had received a letter from President Medvedev telling him that if Azerbaijan supported the designation of the Bolshevik artificial famine in Ukraine as “genocide” at the United Nations, “then you can forget about seeing Nagorno-Karabakh ever again.” […]

Update 2: Saakashvili slammed by China

Some Russian, Georgian, Armenian and Polish media outlets and blogs are also claiming cables exist which indicate that the U.S. did not consider Georgia responsible for the war. However, as EurasiaNet notes, these cables do so far not exist on the Wikileaks site or been mentioned or quoted by any of the organization’s official partner publications in the West. Verification is currently being sought.

But, in other new emerging cables, as quoted and linked to by Civil.Ge, the Georgian President also comes in for a bashing from the Chinese Ambassador in Astana. According to Ambassador Guoping, Saakashvili is “not a mature statesman” and over-reacted to Russian provocations which led to the August 2008 war. He is also reported to have said that Georgia believed it had tacit U.S. support in attempts to take back South Ossetia.

[…] Guoping said, “Clearly, Russia baited and cheated Georgia. But Saakashvili was impressed with his earlier success in Batumi (Adjara) and he thought he could involve the United States in the war.” Guoping said he expects former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze to become Georgia’s next president. “She is much more mature than Saakashvili. He won’t stay long,” he said.

In short, the revelations as they pertain to the region might not be as sensational as many would like, although the allegations of Iranian covert activities being linked to businesses owned by Azerbaijani officials is quite serious, but they have provided us with some very important confirmation regarding negotiations to normalize Armenia-Turkey relations, to end the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia’s relative isolation in the region. In that sense alone, ‘diplomatic crisis’ or not, the disclosures have been more than worthwhile.

Now, if only they could result in some positive outcomes in these areas. Really, if only…