Yerevan Election: Interview with Richard Giragossian

As part of background work for an article on the recent Yerevan municipal election, The Caucasian Knot last week interviewed the newly appointed director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS) on the vote and its ramifications for domestic politics in Armenia.

Richard Giragosian studied Political Science as an undergraduate at the University of Rhode Island and served as a guest lecturer for the U.S. Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

Below is the full transcript of the brief interview.

OK: How would you describe the recent municipal election in Yerevan?

RG: I think it was outrageous and yet another example of what has become a pattern of systemic abuse and misuse of administrative resources, the power of incumbency in this country, and I also think it was yet another lost opportunity for Armenia to actually turn the page after the 1 March fiasco. Having said that, however, my criticism applies to both the opposition and the ruling elite because in many ways the opposition was more focused on the day after the election rather than on the election itself.

Therefore, we saw yet another election defined by personalities over platforms and where the electorate was offered little in terms of alternatives. I think the opposition failed in its strategy and tactics in terms of expecting a new uprising or a re-engagement of the population which has been largely apathetic over the past year. Having said that, Armenia’s first free and fair election was its last in many ways and I think the real hypocrisy is not from the Armenian government or the opposition, but from the European observers who once again endorsed a fragrantly abusive election.

OK: You make it sound as though the international community this on purpose, but could it simply be that there were just so few observers?

RG: In general terms this was very much a local and not a national election even though it was for the capital which is the center for political and economic power in the country. Therefore, a local election necessitates a much more marginal role of election observers. In fact, the absence of the OSCE and ODIHR was normal precisely because it was a local election. It was expected. My disappointment, however, is with the how observers reported and covered the election. In other words, they seemed to be arriving in Armenia prior to the election looking for a sign of progress and the ability to endorse the election results.

However, it wasn’t the election results that were the problem. It was the election process that was the problem and much of the informal observations and comments they made flew in the face of official press conference statements.

OK: Before the election many people were speaking about a redrawing of the political landscape in Armenia, especially when the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D) left government. However, many were unconvinced that the ARF-D left government simply because of differences over relations with Turkey and instead wondered if it had more to do with the election itself.

RG: I think that when the ARF “left” government it was much more geared to Armenia-Turkey relations and mainly because if there hadn’t of been a statement on 22 or 23 April the ARF would still probably be in the coalition. This was a decision made by the ARF seven to eight years too late, in my opinion, and the tardiness of the decision, along with the hypocrisy of the party’s vested interests in the clannish business environment here as well as the offer from the Republican party for them to retain some of their positions even if they did leave the coalition, just exposes a degree of hypocrisy.

Moreover, where is the ARF to go? It is not a true opposition party, sadly, and by pulling out from the coalition they now have nowhere to go. In fact, the opposition in this country today is defined by two camps. There is the so-called “radical opposition” led by Levon Ter-Petrossian which is outside of the system and which fails to deliver any real alternative policy proposals. It is instead the return of old faces and old ideas. The second opposition camp in the country is within the system in the form of the Heritage party which is far too small and composed of deputies that are active on separate issues.

OK: Surprisingly, the ARF-D made less of a noise than expected during the election campaign on Armenia-Turkey relations or Karabakh even though many though they would try to attract the nationalist vote. Instead, the extra-parliamentary opposition ANC really seemed to be trying hard to play this card. Do you think that this was a mistake by the opposition?

RG: Definitely. In fact, one of my fundamental criticisms across the board is that we had a local election driven by a national agenda where this wasn’t about trash collection, road repairs or local issues of concern to Yerevan’s residents. Why is that? It’s a reflection on the sad state of local politics in Armenia where discourse is already fundamentally limited within certain nationalist parameters, but also because it was the first time when Yerevan residents had such a local election and so were not even sure of what to demand or what to look for from candidates.

Therefore, interestingly enough, of all the parties, the ARF was the most surprising by avoiding such a national agenda and to focus more on local issues. However, this was a miscalculation because it failed. In a broader sense, this lack of a local agenda for a local election, in my opinion, is rooted in a bigger problem where we have politics driven by personality and not by platform or policy alternatives. Where’s the shadow cabinet, for example? That’s what I’d expect from a constructive opposition.

Regarding redrawing the political map of Armenia, I don’t consider that this has happened. In fact, I see it more as a consolidation of earlier realities. The only difference from previous elections, and this is interesting, is that within the monolith of the ruling coalition we saw new fractures and fissures appearing in terms of the Republican and Prosperous Armenia parties literally assaulting and getting into fist fights with each other.

This kind of political tension is very hard to resolve at this point, and I do think we see the ruling elite in this country increasingly going in different directions and splitting into three factions – the first president, the former president and the current president. This is an interesting triad of politics.

OK: You’re suggesting that Kocharian still remains a political force?

RG: Not necessarily, because fortunately for the country he has not embarked on a political return nor should he. However, we do see powerful people in the political arena such as Gagik Tsarukian, head of Prosperous Armenia and very much a Kocharian protégé, as well as one of the most ambitious and destructive political forces in the political scene, Parliamentary Chairman Hovik Abrahamian, which could represent a Kocharian camp.

We might see a split in the ruling Republican party itself where we have people such as Daron Margaryan, son of the late prime minister, trying to regain the legacy of his father. In effect, many of the rank and file members of the Republican Party are not quite happy with the fact that the current president hijacked it after the death of the former prime minister and party founder. So, we may see a remaking of the map, but in unexpected directions.

OK: Two parties which did very badly in the election were Orinats Yerkir and the ARF-D. Is there now a question mark hanging over their future?

RG: If there was any concrete result from the election it was a stark reality check for the ARF in terms of its marginalization. However, because of the national agenda and the historical legacy of the party it will always have a small role to play in Armenia unlike Orinats Yerkir where the “Emperor has no clothes.” The façade was confirmed and, in fact, party leader Artur Baghdasarian has been co-opted in his current position as National Security Council Chairman. I think the election demonstrated that it is impossible for the party to sustain itself for long.

And just as I think we’ll see a steady erosion within Orinats Yerkir, Prosperous Armenia has yet to demonstrate that it is a real political force because the other thing the election demonstrated yet again is the lack of true political parties in this country and the lack of any grassroots bottom-up driven policy or ideology-driven parties. The ARF, even though it is one of the few parties with an ideology, is again on the sidelines and in the margins.

OK: And what about the extra-parliamentary opposition? Although they said they had 65 percent support in Yerevan, and while many people are disenchanted with the government, it doesn’t quite work like that. Moreover, instead of appealing to the electorate, the opposition instead automatically expected it.

RG: Exactly, because in other words a lot of the support for Levon Ter-Petrossian is much less support for him, but more a sign of displeasure and dissatisfaction with the current regime and so a lot of the anti-Sargsyan people are galvanizing around Ter-Petrossian. However, they’re losing momentum, in my opinion, and if we look at the key constituency of youth – whether it’s Hima! Or Sksela!, whoever these youth activists are – even they’re disgruntled, discouraged and pulling away from Ter-Petrossian. In terms of opposition polarization, there’s no viable alternative. There’s nothing new being offered in Armenia or Georgia, and in many ways this works by default in favor of the incumbent.

OK: So, in conclusion, what was the lesson learnt from this election?

RG: It wasn’t a lesson. It was strictly confirmation that things are still unacceptably bad and we’re going in the wrong direction. Armenia is approaching a crossroads where it might even become even more authoritarian by following a Belarus model. However, the real determinant here is not politics; it is economics, in my opinion. The political stalemate and polarization can sustain the system, and it can be managed, but an economic crisis would be the tipping point. If the government can’t handle that, then this will pose more serious challenges.

It’s an economic crisis in terms of remittances and no longer being able to support the commodity-based cartel corruption that is the economic system in Armenia and we may reach a point where its economics that breaks open the closed political and economic system that has defined the country for so long.

Richard Giragossian, ACNIS, Yerevan, Armenia © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 2009