Nagorno Karabakh: Refugees, Occupied Territories & Selective Memory Loss

With only a few weeks having passed since the meeting in Moscow of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents, and as the three Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group visit Yerevan in the latest round of discussions as part of the ongoing peace process, the political climate appears to be heating up.

Despite most analysts and observers, as well as diplomats and experts on the conflict, considering the resulting declaration to be too vague to be of any significance or merely a public relations exercise for Medvedev following the Russian invasion of Georgia, RFE/RL reports that the opposition led by former president Levon Ter-Petrossian is threatening to resume street protests in case of “dangerous developments.” Armenia Now also reports that the opposition Heritage party plans to do the same.

The party’s chairperson, Anahit Bakhshyan, raises the issue of ethnic Armenian refugees from Shahumian and Baku — most of which do not now live in refugee collective centers — although doesn’t mention if she also advocates the return of ethnic Azerbaijanis to their homes in Armenia. The article also quotes a representative of the minor opposition Hunchak party in warning that if a peace agreement is signed based on the so-called Madrid Principles, war will be the result.

“We propose a swap – say Aghdam for Shahumyan, since we lost Shahumyan and refugees from there do not have an opportunity to live in their native land. If Azerbaijan raises the question of the return of refugees, then Armenia must also raise the same issue, up to the return of [Armenian] refugees to Baku,” she says.

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“If the settlement happens on the basis of the current proposal, there will be a war that will be fiercer than the first one. Thus, the international community will not be content with that alone, and it will turn the Caucasus into a region resembling the zone of the permanent Arab-Israeli conflict, which will meet the interests of superpowers,” he said.

Refugee from Shahumian, Silikian, Republic of Armenia © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994

Thomas de Waal, author of Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, touched upon the issue of the right to return refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in an interview held with The Caucasian Knot / Oneworld Multimedia in 2002. Of course, over fourteen years after the ceasefire, it would appear that many have forgotten the territory outside Karabakh — apart from the strategic Lachin corridor — were only meant to be a bargaining chip in negotiations.

I think that it’s unrealistic to expect Armenians to return to Azerbaijan or the Azerbaijanis to return to Armenia. Both nations have filled the gap since they left, and certainly filled the houses. However, the right to return is more enforceable when we’re talking about people in and around Karabagh, and that also refers to Armenians from the Shahumian region.

I don’t think that anyone in Armenia expects to hold on to places like Fizuli, Aghdam and Jebrail. In every attempt at a settlement since 1994, these areas were negotiable and so yes, these people will have the right to return. The problem is that their homes are now completely levelled and even if they do get the opportunity, it might take ten or twenty years before they do actually return.

Refugees from Shahumian, Silikian, Republic of Armenia © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1998

Regardless, most view the Russian declaration as at least an undertaking by Azerbaijan not to use military force to resolve the conflict. Indeed, up until the signing of the document, increased military spending by Baku threatened an arms race in the South Caucasus until such a time as fighting would resume. Meanwhile, Armenia Now reports that Nagorno Karabakh insists it be a full party to the negotiations. However, in the past, it’s limited status as an interested party with restricted rights has proven an obstacle in the search for peace.

It is not possible to give a full account of the OSCE process’s weaknesses here. They included, among other things: the ambivalence of Nagorny Karabakh towards a process in which its representatives participated only as an ‘interested party’ rather than full member; unstable leadership of the process in the early years; uneven levels of interest among key group members, whose attention often shifted to other international crises, and their own self-interested dividedness and inability to exert concerted pressure on the conflicting parties;

Meanwhile, despite the ceasefire agreement, as well as various UN Security Council Resolutions and the entire peace process, stipulating that the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh would be returned in exchange for an agreement on the status of Nagorno Karabakh, some nationalists and opposition forces accuse the Armenian president, Serge Sargsyan, of being ready to “sell-out” the territory. RFE/RL reports that Sargsyan outlined his position in an interview with a German newspaper this week.

“The control over territories is not an end in itself for us, but is aimed at Karabakh’s security. Today we need to negotiate over principles of settlement, which can be followed by the basic peace accord. We still have a long way to go,” Sarkisian said, according to the text of his interview disseminated by the presidential press office Tuesday.

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The Armenian leader also effectively excluded a status of Karabakh implying its dependence on Baku as he said that history proves Armenians cannot develop in a safe environment under Azerbaijani rule.

“We have never thought that Karabakh can remain within Azerbaijan with any status,” he said.

However, most analysts and diplomats only consider current developments to be a “small step” forwards although hope that a possible meeting between the Armenian, Azerbaijan and Turkish presidents in Istanbul could result in further progress. In the meantime, while blogger Artashes98 reminds his readers that the return of occupied territories was always intended, the words of a senior adviser to former President Levon Ter-Petrossian continue to ring true whenever international mediators talk of the possibility for peace.

[…] This approach left the public out of the process, casting a shadow of suspicion over all proposals, which became vulnerable to demagogic exploitation by opposition groups. The charge of ‘selling out’ was one not easily overcome by politically weak authorities. In an atmosphere filled with nationalistic rhetoric, authorities often failed to garner public support for reasonable solutions, and found themselves blaming their ‘peoples’ for their unreadiness for compromise.

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The two alternatives to a negotiated solution – a renewal of hostilities or a solution imposed through forceful action by the major powers – cannot be attractive to either party.

Refugees from Shahumian, Silikian, Republic of Armenia © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994