http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts15.php

There’s also more on the 1994 ceasefire agreement in this CRS Issue Brief:

On February 18, 1994, Russian Defense Minister Grachev presented a plan, for a cease-fire, disengagement and withdrawal, Russian mobile observer groups, and a joint staff from Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Karabakh. Karabakh’s status would be decided at a summit of Russian, Armenian, and Azeri Presidents, with Karabakh participating. Armenia and Karabakh reportedly agreed to withdraw; Azerbaijan agreed to a cease-fire, but insisted that Armenians withdraw first. Russia revised the plan, but Azerbaijan called for simultaneous pull backs. Armenia favored a cease-fire, but only with separating forces, and said that Russia represented the only potential guarantor because the international community was “detached.” On April 1-2, the Russian President’s Special Envoy Kazimirov and a CIS delegation offered a plan: (1) a cease-fire, followed by separation of forces, and mechanisms to prevent resumed military operations; observers deploy; (2) withdrawal of troops and equipment from occupied territories, lifting blockades, and return of refugees. A revision called for Russian separation forces 3 days after a cease-fire, with CSCE observers deploying 3 days later. The Azeri parliament rejected the plan. The Russian Speaker arranged a cease-fire, called the Bishkek Protocol. Armenia and Karabakh agreed. Azerbaijan agreed on May 8, substituting “international” for “CIS” peacekeepers in the text.

A cease-fire took effect on May 12, 1994. On May 16, Grachev revised his plan: a cease-fire, disengagement, observers from Russia, the CIS, and the conflicting sides (with a Russian in charge) at buffer zone posts, safeguarded by 1,800 CIS troops, primarily Russians, under the command of the Russian First Deputy Defense Minister. No CSCE representative was the meeting and Grachev’s plan was believed to be designed to thwart CSCE oversight. In June, the Minsk Group chairman suggested that a unified CSCE/Russian approach might prevent antagonists from playing intermediaries off against each other. A Minsk Group meeting in July directed him to clarify the CSCE role in Russia’s plan. Azerbaijan insisted that no country provide more than 30% of the peacekeepers. An armistice agreement was signed on July 27. A revised Russian plan called for Russians to comprise 60% to 90% of a 3,000-6,000 man force with 254 CSCE observers to be deployed 4 to 6 weeks after a political agreement. Baku wanted Russia to deploy after the CSCE. Kazimirov charged that the Minsk Group wanted to increase its role and decrease Russia’s role.

In Moscow, the parties agreed to lesser provisions of a political agreement and to observe a cease-fire until an accord is reached. Tension increased between CSCE and Russian mediators. CSCE only observed the Moscow rounds. The Minsk Group chairman called for unifying Moscow and CSCE efforts. Kazimirov did not attend a Minsk Group meeting, and later charged that the Group wanted Russia “out of the game.” On September 15-18, CSCE Senior Officials objected to Russia’s unilateral actions and its pressure for Russian/CIS peacekeepers. They called for “harmonization.” In October, the Acting CSCE Chairman asked members whether they would contribute to a force of 2,000, no more than 30% from one country, to deploy for an initial 6- month period. Russia demanded a CSCE mandate for negotiations in which Russia would have prime responsibility. The December 6 OSCE Budapest Summit directed the chairman to name a Minsk Conference co-chair to realize full coordination. A planning group will recommend the size and characteristics of a peacekeeping force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement, and arrangements with contributing states. The Chairman is to seek U.N. support. After preparations, the OSCE Permanent Council will decide on peacekeeping. Unconfirmed media reports said that the summit had decided on a 3,000-man force, with no single country providing more than 30%, at a cost of $40 million for 6 months. A Russian diplomat was named co-chair of the Minsk Conference on January 6, 1995.

A new OSCE-Russia draft reportedly proposed that after Armenia and Azerbaijan sign an agreement to end the war, negotiations, including Karabakh status, will occur. Azerbaijan wanted peacekeepers after a political accord and rejected dealing with Karabakh as an equal. A Group meeting, without the parties, was concerned about border incidents, explosions on communications lines, the parties’ unpreparedness to compromise, and the effect of the last on peacekeeping preparations. On April 21, Finnish Deputy Foreign Minister became Minsk Conference co-chair. Finnish General Villen said that there would be 4,500 disengagement troops.

In July, Armenia and Karabakh emphasized threats to Karabakh that might follow troop withdrawal, arguing that OSCE peacekeepers could not counter an armed assault. They sought to increase Armenia’s role in guaranteeing Karabakh security . In October, the two sides reportedly agreed on separation of troops, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and a no-fly zone; but not on status, Lachin, etc. On October 19, Azeri Presidential Advisor Guluzade reportedly said that Azerbaijan was ready to discuss limited OSCE control over the Lachin corridor. On October 20, the Russian and Finnish Presidents wrote to their Armenian and Azeri counterparts, calling for focus on liberating occupied territories, return of refugees, and security guarantees for Karabakh, and saying that an understanding on Lachin would give impetus to negotiations. In November, Russia proposed that Lachin and an adjacent area become a “transit zone” through which the movement of goods and people would be guaranteed and where international observers, not peacekeepers, would be deployed. Armenia and Karabakh insist that the corridor remain under Armenian control until final status is determined.

http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-109.htm