Georgia: Security in the Caucasus
Security in the Caucasus, a new blog established by a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics currently undertaking field work in the region, says that the recent conflict between Russia and Georgia was largely the result of a major miscalculation by Tbilisi. The blog also says that the confrontation was one by proxy between the West and a re-assertive Russia.
[…] As such, it is not just the result of miscalculations made in Tbilisi in 2008, but the logical conclusion to a series of mistakes and misperceptions in Western capitals – and in Washington, in particular. This is not just a tale of a small country bravely (but somewhat hopelessly) confronting a Great Power on its own – it is also the story of the amateurish, ideologised and bungling approach to international politics that has been the hallmark of the Bush administration since its coming to power. In the longer term, it is the result of a dangerous disregard for international law, and the application of double standards in conflicts throughout the world by the West – with Kosovo as only the most striking example. The West should have known that such law-bending was bound to blow up in its face in the longer term. And now it has – in Georgia.
[…]
It is quite clear that Russia has been drawing a red line in the sand for some time now – rejecting any attempts by NATO to expand into ‘its’ near abroad. To the West, this issue is one of enhancing energy security and expanding the democratic zone of peace. Russia, by contrast, perceives the matter in much more existential terms – it sees its long-term survival as a great power as depending on a buffer, a zone of exclusive strategic influence. Moscow may be quite wrong in this perception, but everything suggests it would be willing to go to extreme lengths in order to maintain this essential objective, including dismembering Georgia, and perhaps even the Ukraine, in reaction to their pro-Western strategic orientations. For all the benefits NATO expansion would bring, Western capitals should ask themselves whether their goals are worth infringing on interests which Russia sees as essential to its survival. The core interests of Great Powers are only ignored at great risk – and, quite frankly, neither Georgia nor the Ukraine are worth the global conflagration which their move towards NATO might cause, if they would in fact be able to survive such a move.
Instead of attempting the impossible and risking the inconceivable, the Western alliance should start talking to Russia in its own language – that of realpolitik. First, it should draw a red line in the sand itself, by making it clear to Russia that any aggression or harassment of an established NATO member would be dealt with collectively; Russia has so far shown itself prudent, in practice, vis-a-vis those countries that are subject to protection under article 5, which should not be allowed to lose its deterrent effect. Second, the Alliance should come to an understanding with Moscow regarding the status of the former Soviet Union as a ‘neutral’ buffer zone, desisting from expansion in return for the non-aligned status of these states, which would also have to be encouraged to develop foreign policies that are prudent and balanced, taking into account the interests of their larger northern neighbour. The recent Turkish proposal of a Caucasus Stability Pact, while fraught with difficulty, could point the way in that regard. […]
Security in the Caucasus is here.
- Published:
- 08.31.08 / 9pm by Onnik
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