Georgia: Tough Questions for Saakashvili

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• Georgia: An Inevitable War?
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• Georgia: Drone Shot Down Over Abkhazia
• Georgia: Tough Days Ahead for Saakashvili?
• Georgia: Saakashvili Support Still Strong
• Georgia: War with Russia
• Georgia: The Blame Game
• Georgia: U.S. Military to Deliver Humanitarian Aid

1. Onnik 08.25.08 / 1pm

   Saakashvili’s Account of Events that Led to Conflict

   Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 25 Aug.’08 / 03:30

   […]

   Saakashvili pointed out that the Georgian authorities expected Russia’s attack from the Abkhaz direction, rather than from South Ossetia, “so major forces” of the Georgian army were deployed in the west.

   He said that as situation started to deteriorate on August 7, “we moved one brigade [of the Georgian armed forces] closer to South Ossetia, and later another [brigade] as well.”

   “But our major forces were still deployed in the west; there was a brigade at Senaki [military base] and we did not call back our brigade from Iraq, because I was deeply convinced up to the last minute that Russia would not have done such a large-scale provocation,” Saakashvili said.

   “Although we were under fire from the 120mm mortar launchers I announced a unilateral ceasefire; at that time we already had one killed soldiers in the village of Avnevi and four others were wounded; [Georgian Defense Minister Davit] Kezerashvili was begging me to let him open artillery fire, because, he was telling me, otherwise he was not able to bring [wounded soldiers] from [the village]. But my response was that we could not open fire whatever happened,” Saakashvili said.

   He said that the Georgian side tried to communicate with the Russian authorities, but they were claiming as if they were no longer controlling South Ossetian separatist authorities and their militiamen.

   He said that information came late on August 7 that the Russian military hardware was rolling through Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia. He said that Georgia was observing existing agreements and had no heavy arms in the Georgian-controlled areas of the breakaway region.

   “So the only way to stop their [Russian forces and South Ossetian militias] movement into the Georgian villages was to use medium-size artillery for blowing up the bridge at Didi Gupta and for [closing] the road coming from Roki Tunnel… So as soon as they [the Russian tanks] started to roll into South Ossetia we started firing to the road [at Roki Tunnel]; at the same time we were responding to the fire coming from the South Ossetian positions including from the center of Tskhinvali, their government headquarters and from their Defense Ministry,” he said.

   Saakashvili also said that he “strictly ordered” not to fire in direction of civilian population and “this order was fully observed.”

   “We conducted our first flight [apparently by SU-25 warplanes available in the Georgian army] at dawn [August 8] in direction of Java and Roki Tunnel and our pilots informed us that whole area was full of the Russian military,” he said and added that it was impossible for such large number of the Russian army to concentrate in the area just overnight.

   By saying this Saakashvili was apparently trying to counter the Russia’s claims that it has sent its troops into South Ossetia only after the Georgian forces started to attack Tskhinvali.

   “If someone thinks that it was Georgia, which triggered what had happened, should better realize how it was possible to bring in such large army only in hours; this is unreal,” Saakashvili said.

   He has also claimed that Russian army’s, as he put it, unnoticed infiltration into South Ossetia before the conflict started was “a failure of the international intelligence.”

   “When we are asking our western partners: did not you see them coming, they are responding that their satellites were directed mainly on Iraq and that they could not fly over [Georgia], but it was impossible to see what was happening on the ground because it was cloudy. So it was a serious failure of the international intelligence; they would not have hidden this information from us, if they knew it; but they also did not know it,” he said.

   He also said that the Georgian artillery had destroyed “large part of this Russian military in Java during the early stage of the conflict.

   “The 4th brigade and the military unit from Kojori have destroyed hundreds of soldiers… and Gen. [Anatoly] Khrulev [a commander of Russia’s 58th army] was wounded. After that Putin arrived in Vladikavkaz, mobilizes entire forces and Russia’s entire forces moved towards Georgia… Russians conducted 200 combat flights” Saakashvili said.

   “We managed to stop them on the first day, on the second day and on the third day 500 more armored vehicles started moving into Georgia [from Roki Tunnel],” he added.

   He then justified withdrawal of the Georgian forces from South Ossetia and adjacent areas saying that it would have been impossible to stop additional 500 units of the Russian armored vehicles and the Georgian troops were under the risk of “destruction.”

   “So we took that decision [to pull back]; this was the time when the world started waking up,” Saakashvili said. “One hour after the President Bush’s statement [Russian] tanks stopped rolling [in direction of Tbilisi].”

   He said that the Georgian soldiers “fought hard,” although acknowledged that “there could have been some mistakes in planning.”

   In the end of his speech, Saakashvili said that Russia’s goal was “to collapse the Georgia’s economy; to trigger chaos and as a result to put an end to the Georgian statehood.”

   “Our goal is to overcome [the economic] crisis; it will take three or four months; it won’t be easy, but we will overcome this heavy crisis in three or fourth months and in next year or year and a half Georgia’s economy will again start to grow rapidly,” Saakashvili said.

   […]

   http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19282
2. Onnik 08.25.08 / 1pm

   Another take, however, comes from the former British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Rodric Braithwaite. For now this seems to be the main consensus of opinion among independent observers and analysts.

   That is, there was provocation, but Saakashvil reacted on hot-headed impulse rather than reason. There probably was the hope that the West would intervene, but of course, there was really very little they were willing or able to do.

   Main question now is that considering it was all an error of judgement and probably dictated by emotion, should Saakashvili resign? This is especially the case as one of his main campaign promises — to unite Georgia — looks unlikely to ever be realized.

   With the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili, another democratically elected president, things began to go downhill. The Americans gave him political and economic support and advice, and equipped and trained his army. He turned out to be the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, and outran American control. He provoked the Russians and the South Ossetians by one pinprick after another, and, above all, by his application to join Nato.
   The Russians regularly warned that there would be consequences. Egged on by the Russians, the South Ossetians increased their provocations. Perhaps it was a deliberate trap. If so, Saakashvili fell right into it. His soldiers had no hope of beating the Russians in a fight. Maybe he assumed that the West would bail him out: an epic miscalculation. Many Georgians now feel that the West betrayed them. In due course they will no doubt turn on Saakashvili himself.

   http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/rodric-braithwaite-georgia-is-no-place-for-empty-promises-907057.html
3. Onnik 08.25.08 / 1pm

   And a very candid opinion piece from Pat Buchanan, a senior adviser to Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan.

   His take on Saakashvili’s temperament is especially true and not disputed by most people who know him well. Indeed, it has long been argued that while Saakashvili was precisely the type of character needed to lead the November 2003 Rose Revolution, his presidency should have been limited to one term.

   But it wasn’t and the Russians knew how to press the right buttons, and finally they got what they wanted. I think this is the ultimate conclusion from the events of the past few weeks. However, countries need presidents that do not act on emotion or impulse, especially when it can result in war.

   The American people should be eternally grateful to Old Europe for having spiked the Bush-McCain plan to bring Georgia into NATO.

   PAT Had Georgia been in NATO when Mikheil Saakashvili invaded South Ossetia, we would be eyeball to eyeball with Russia, facing war in the Caucasus, where Moscow’s superiority is as great as U.S. superiority in the Caribbean during the Cuban missile crisis.

   If the Russia-Georgia war proves nothing else, it is the insanity of giving erratic hotheads in volatile nations the power to drag the United States into war.

   […]

   If Cold War II is coming, who started it, if not us?

   The swift and decisive action of Putin’s army in running the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia in 24 hours after Saakashvili began his barrage and invasion suggests Putin knew exactly what Saakashvili was up to and dropped the hammer on him.

   What did we know? Did we know Georgia was about to walk into Putin’s trap? Did we not see the Russians lying in wait north of the border? Did we give Saakashvili a green light?

   Joe Biden ought to be conducting public hearings on who caused this U.S. humiliation.

   The war in Georgia has exposed the dangerous overextension of U.S. power. There is no way America can fight a war with Russia in the Caucasus with our army tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nor should we. Hence, it is demented to be offering, as John McCain and Barack Obama are, NATO membership to Tbilisi.

   […]

   Who rules Abkhazia and South Ossetia is none of our business. And after this madcap adventure of Saakashvili, why not let the people of these provinces decide their own future in plebiscites conducted by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe?

   As for Saakashvili, he’s probably toast in Tbilisi after this stunt. Let the neocons find him an endowed chair at the American Enterprise Institute.

   http://www.creators.com/opinion/pat-buchanan/who-started-cold-war-ii.html
4. Onnik 08.25.08 / 1pm

   Gorbachev’s Version: A Reminder to the West?

   He’s been out of power for years, but Gorbachev’s perspective has always been an important consideration for me - because he has one thing a lot of other politicians lack; sincerity. That goes for politicians of every stripe and in every country too - it’s a rare gift in any political system it seems. So imagine my surprise when Gorbachev, winner of the Nobel Peace Price and co-architect of ‘Glasnost’ up and contradicted my own opinion on recent events in Georgia.

   Here I’d gone off thinking that Russia was just after a re-expansion of its “Evil Empire” following Putin’s re-totalitarianization of Russian politics. Well that, and to covet a near-monopoly on an oil pipeline to the west. And while each of these motives need not be forgotten completely, there are many other issues at heart in the dispute which deserve equal consideration. A letter the former leader of the USSR writes to the New York Times (linked above) highlights a few of these with his usual eloquence and welcome commentary on the west’s own political hubris. Ever the peace-maker, Gorbachev hits at the heart of causes of this conflict, laying it squarely in the lap of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

   Since the start of the conflict, I’d thought Saakashvili, himself, a little suspect of instigating it, but had come down favouring the Georgian side more because the conflict appeared to have been sparked by Russian-backed South Ossetian militants. But Gorbachev seems to suggest that the Georgians may have over-reacted in rocket-bombing positions in South Ossetia initially - a possibility I’d considered. Even so, that doesn’t mean the Russian side needed to escalate things further by responding with invasion. Nor is it immediately evident that Russia needs to install a permanent military presence (as it is clearly doing). If Saakashvili was being reckless, as Gorbachev suggests, he’s a good deal more likely to exercise caution now having seen Russia’s response. This is assuming that he wants to act in the best interests of his people.

   In the end, Gorbachev didn’t persuade me entirely that Russia was blameless (not that this was his aim) - nor even that it should escape sanction-free. But he did persuade me that there’s more here than the western media has been reporting. And that Georgia shouldn’t be treated as the innocent victim of the situation. This isn’t another Iraq-Kuwait type of dispute with a unilateral, unprovoked invasion. Regardless, both sides will need to make efforts to ensure peace in the region - and that means going a lot further than either has to promote prolonged peace. Even if Georgia over-reacted recklessly, imposing a permanent military occupation force in response is scarcely better than the imposition of the Treaty of Versaille on post-World War I Germany, which, as we all know, was a key instrument in the creation of World War II. Georgia won independence from the Soviet Union legitimately and that means accepting that it might choose a destiny outside the parameters of what the Kremlin may prefer from time to time. Having a pro-western government or even being a member of NATO needn’t mean being anti-Russian.

   […]

   http://ross613.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!6CD05D8DA4B79EE2!1121.entry
5. Armenia & the South Caucasus | The Caucasian Knot » Blog Archive » Georgia: Tough Days Ahead for Mikhail Saakashvili? 09.26.08 / 3pm

   […] society was roughly divided in two and even before then some political forces started to show the first sign of dissent. Shaping opinion at both home and abroad was crucial for Saakashvili, especially in light of Moscow […]

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